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MEMOIRS OF A FOX 
By Ned D. Bayley* 
The curtain has come down on one production of "The Foxes 
Guarding the Chicken-house." I was a member of the cast. In fact, 
for two and a half years I played the leading role among the char-
acters considered by many as the Foxes. 
The plot centered around the actions of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture in regulating the use of pesticides. Since farmers 
are the major users of pesticides and since agribusiness companies 
produce them, the USDA regulatory responsibilities and actions 
regarding pesticide use and safety have often been described as the 
"foxes guarding the chicken-house." 
The pesticide regulatory activities in the USDA are not the only 
ones which have been so described, for the actions of the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Maritime 
Commission and others have also been similarly portrayed. How-
ever, the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 
December 1970 removed the pesticide regulatory uni.t from USDA 
and provides an opportunity for retrospective observations. 
My experience in trying to make the USDA actions fully re-
sponsive to public need has convinced me that pinning the diffi-
culties involved on a "fox-guarding-the-chicken-house" concept 
is dangerously simplistic. Unless other problems, some of them 
more important than any agricultural bias of the USDA, are also 
openly recognized and corrected, this country's confidence in pesti-
cide regulation as well as many other regulatory activities of the 
Federal Government will not be restored. 
What are these other factors? There are five which I find of 
major importance: one, the conditioning of civil servants over long 
periods of time to one or two interest groups; two, the manner in 
which a conditioned bureaucracy responds when a sudden onslaught 
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of criticism comes from a new source; three, the administrative 
attitude of a regulatory agency when its activities are dominated by 
a scientific point of view; four, the division of regulatory responsi-
bilities among several agencies of the Federal Government; and 
five, the change that has taken place in public attitudes toward the 
traditional posture of agencies that exist to protect the public and 
toward the responsibility of the user of products in avoiding mis-
use. 
The regulation of pesticides began in 19101 with a law designed 
to protect buyers, mostly farmers, from possible misrepresentation 
of what the chemicals could do. The USDA was given the responsi-
bility of protecting the farmers. The pesticide chemical industry 
geared up to protect themselves against any excessive regulatory 
action. 
During this early period, the personnel administering the regu-
lations were conditioned to responding to criticism in certain ways. 
Conditioned responses of civil servants to outside criticism is as 
normal as the conditioned reflexes of the human body to external 
nervous stimuli. Such responses are not an indication that civil 
servants are inferior citizens or that they, any more than other 
people, are corruptible. To the contrary, the people administering 
the pesticide regulations have a long history of dedication to pur-
pose and pride in their contribution to pesticide effectiveness and 
safety. 
Interestingly enough it is that very dedication which makes them 
susceptible to conditioning by criticism. All dedicated people, and 
particularly organizations, seek feedback or reinforcement as a mea-
sure of their effectiveness. For regulatory people, these measures 
may be expressed within the organization in terms of numbers of 
applications processed, modified, or rejected, or the number of 
products sampled and tested or the number of products seized. 
But in regulatory work, external feedback on effectiveness is 
not to be found in applause from the public (there usually isn't 
any) but rather in the low level, or absence, of criticism received. 
Regulation is a thankless job. The civil servants involved hear only 
from those parts of the public which are displeased with their 
actions. Letter writing is one form the public uses to express dis-
pleasure and the mail directed to regulatory agencies is often 
voluminous. 
Various interest groups know that in addition to obtaining 
Congressional assistance, the most effective impact on bureaucratic 
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decisions can be made by personal visits to the government offices 
for the presentation of oral arguments. 
To reduce the time demanded by such groups, the regulatory 
agencies have, within the limit of law, often assembled such interest 
groups collectively in formal or informal advisory committees. Such 
action allows the critics still more opportunity to criticize because 
advisory committees often discuss the development of policy as 
well as the consequences of action. 
The objective of the critics is to minimize action adverse to 
their interests, and one of the objectives of the regulatory civil 
servants is to minimize the amount of criticism. A Pareto Optimum 
-the point where further arrangements cannot be made without 
injuring the interests of either df the negotiating parties-is 
reached when the interest groups and the civil servants describe 
their relations as "cooperative." 
It should be a wonder to no one, then, that the civil servants 
administering pesticide regulations were more conditioned to 
farmer and chemical company criticism than to public health and 
environment criticism at the time, immediately following World 
War II, when the flood of new pesticide chemicals poured onto the 
market. The facts are that. prior to that time, the civil servants had 
been exposed to relatively little criticism other than that from 
farmers and chemical company sources. 
The tremendous success of new pesticides in saving lives during 
World War II resulted in a marked buildup in the production 
of these chemicals. As the war came to an end, these products were 
made available to the civilian market. Since 1946, the civilian use 
of pesticides has more than tripled. In addition to agricultural 
use, most urban and suburban dwellers in the country have been 
using a great variety of chemicals in a large number of forms, 
packaged for convenient push-button use. 
The growing promiscuousness with which pesticides were being 
used soon raised cries of alarm, particularly regarding contamination 
of foods. The bureaucracy responded to some extent. USDA and 
the pesticide industry worked with Congress in enacting a new law 
in 19472 and modifying it in 1959.3 The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's powers over pesticide residues in foods were strengthened 
in 1954.4 
But a series of events occurred in the early 1960's that upset the 
success with which the pesticide regulators were able to deal with 
outside criticism. One of these events was the increasing refinement 
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of analytical technology to the point where pesticide residues on 
food and in the environment could be detected at levels many fold 
lower than previously considered possible. Various uses of pesti-
cides that were allowed only if no residues occurred on foods were 
challenged because residues could now be detected with the newly 
improved analytical methods. 
The impact of these new analytical methods became a public 
issue at Thanksgiving time in 1959 when the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare warned people about traces of pesticide 
residues on some cranberries. After considerable controversy, the 
cranberry issue was settled but the vulnerability of existing laws, 
regulations and policies on pesticides had been clearly exposed. 
Another assault on pesticide regulatory procedures occurred as 
a result of the publication in the fall of 1962 of Rachel Carson's 
Silent Spring. The defensive reaction of the "conditioned" pesti-
cide regulators to Silent Spring was to some extent what would be 
expected. USDA noted the book, justified their current regulatory 
activities, pointed to new steps towards interagency cooperation in 
the Federal Government, and requested more funds for research 
and education. Those who supported Rachel Carson's plea for 
action to protect the environment were heard but not taken too 
seriously. Acute concern for the environment was not represented 
in the long-standing advisory and cooperative arrangements be-
tween USDA, the farmers and the pesticide chemical companies. 
An additional factor that contributed to defense of the status 
quo was the placement of the regulatory unit within the research 
agency of USDA. Because of this placement, the decisions and 
procedures for decisions were dominated by science-trained and 
science-oriented personnel. Although scientific data are essential 
to decision-making on pesticide regulations, I believe (as a scientist 
who has had to modify his thinking drastically as an administrator) 
that having a regulatory function operate under a science-domi-
nated administration is a mistake. 
Although there are several important differences between science 
and regulatory administration, the scientist's concept of reality was 
the most important one affecting the regulation of pesticides in 
USDA. Reality for a scientist is the validity or lack of validity in a 
technical hypothesis: what the scientific facts indicate is right is 
right, and what the facts fail to indicate is wrong. 
Requests, demands and recommendations based on information 
not developed entirely within the framework of scientific disci-
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plines are usually immediately suspect. Conclusions based even in 
part on exaggerations or over-generalizations are justification for 
outrageous indignation, and the integrity of the person who puts 
forth such conclusions is subject to question. These basic ethics are 
rigidly adhered to by nearly all scientists within their field of profi-
ciency, even though they are as generally ignored by scientists as 
by other persons when drawing conclusions outside their own 
fields. 
Regulatory civil servants have an obligation, as do scientists, to 
assemble and utilize all the facts available, but they cannot afford 
in the public interest to reject or condemn conclusions in the man-
ner in which scientists are trained-i.e., because a part of the sup-
porting evidence is wrong. They have an obligation to sort through 
the large amount of information which is submitted to them, reach 
beyond the emotional fervor with which it is often presented, and 
sift out those portions which are valid and which may require 
action. The training needed for this type of activity is much closer 
to that of a jurist and a public administrator than that usually 
provided to a scientist. 
For these reasons when the public outcry over Silent Spring 
reached the science-oriented pesticide regulatory unit in USDA, 
the reaction was one of professional indignation and outrage. The 
book was written in emotional tones. Colorful, non-scientific adjec-
tives had been substituted for detached and dispassionate scientific 
data. The author insulted the science-trained regulators by 
accusing them in terms outside the framework of their own disci-
plines.5 
USDA pesticide regulators were not alone in this reaction. They 
had support from their scientific colleagues within the USDA re-
search agency, from their colleagues in colleges and universities, and 
even from some medical scientists. One well-known public health 
authority stated that Rachel Carson "abandons scientific proof and 
truth and combats them with exaggeration and unscientific deduc-
tive reasoning based On axioms of her own making." Still another 
medical researcher stated, " ... in view of her scientific qualifica-
tions in contrast to those of our distinguished scientific leaders and 
statesmen, this book should be ignored." 
It is not surprising then that the science-oriented pesticide regu-
latory administrators in USDA, instead of sifting out the valid 
conclusions and warnings in Silent Spring, spent most of their 
efforts in justifying their current activities based on the "facts" 
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they had. They reacted to her portrait of total disaster instead of 
acknowledging that many of her accounts of localized damage had 
occurred and were occurring with increasing frequency. They were 
insulted by her attacks on bureaucratic obfuscation instead of 
acknowledging that she, too, recognized the need to control pests 
at the same time she was issuing a warning about the potential con-
sequences of present control methods. They were appalled by the 
strength of her adjectives and her casual treatment of technical 
details instead of being gratified at the sharp manner in which she 
pointed out the shortcomings of available pest control methods. 
Characteristic also of research-oriented personnel were the 
recommendations of the President's Science Advisory Committee 
in reaction to Silent Spring. Their report called for reviews and 
some mild changes in pesticide regulations and pest control pro-
grams; however, their recommendations were largely for data-
gathering programs, expanded research and education efforts. 
A second problem with the placement of the pesticides regula-
tion unit within the Agricultural Research Service was the emphasis 
on research versus regulation in approaching pesticide problems. 
The agency, in responding to rising public concern, requested 
more than $14 million additional support for research, but only 
slightly more than $1 million to increase regulatory activities. 
Furthermore, the pace of decision-making is drastically different 
in research and regulatory agencies. Research personnel take the 
long view-hoping to obtain results in 3, 5, even 10 or 20 years. 
Regulatory agencies must meet daily crises demanding immediate 
action. These two concepts of administrative action simply do not 
mIX. 
It is true that a number of steps were taken within the Agri-
cultural Research Service of USDA to improve its pesticide regula-
tory activities during the 1960's. The regulatory unit which had 
been under the supervision of a larger division was given separate, 
equal status. In 1964, an amendment to the Federallaw6 eliminated 
the right of manufacturers to have a pesticide registered under 
"protest" against USDA objections. Interagency agreements were 
developed to increase communication among Federal departments 
on pest control and pesticide activities. New procedures were 
adopted to speed up the processing of registration applications. 
Nevertheless, these improvements made almost no impact on the 
major reason for rising public concern-the danger to the total 
environment. The emphasis in pesticide regulation continued to 
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be focused on chemicals "safe for users, safe for people living in the 
area where it is used, safe for crops and livestock, and safe in respect 
to residues in foods." 
A major effort continued on research and education. The re-
searchers' objective: "To find a highly selective pesticide that 
would be completely safe. A pesticide that is effective, selective and 
safe would eliminate need for regulation." Only late in the 1960's 
did the agency change its position to recognize that all pesticides, 
by their nature, would have to be considered economic poisons and 
would need regulation. 
The difficulties in regulating pesticides were also aggravated by 
the distribution of responsibilities among several agencies of the 
Federal government, primarily the Agricultural Research Service 
of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration of Health, 
Education, and Welfare. All applications for registration of 
chemicals that could leave residues in food were referred to FDA 
for establishment of a tolerance-either at zero or at some accept-
able level. A later interdepartmental agreement provided that 
applications also be sent to the Department of the Interior. Review 
comments were to include environmental safety as well as human 
safety and food residues. The final decision on registration, how-
ever, remained in USDA. 
Much has been written about the large number of objections to 
registration of various chemicals which were raised by the other 
two departments (particularly HEW) and which were subsequently 
overruled by USDA. This has often been attributed to USDA's 
bias towards the use of chemical pesticides and its lack of regard for 
human health and the environment. This bias of the conditioned 
regulatory unit in USDA may have been a factor but it was not 
the controlling one. The major deficiency was the failure of the 
bureaucratic machinery in all three departments. 
The interdepartmental agreement, for example, included a pro-
vision that a disagreement could be brought before the Secretary 
of Agriculture by any of the participating departments. Such dis-
agreements could be sent by the operating units of HEW or the 
Department of Interior directly to the Secretary of Agriculture or 
brought to his attention by higher echelons, including the other 
Secretaries themselves. In no single instance did' this ever happen 
despite the large number of recorded disagreements over a long 
period of time. Under the pressure of Congressional hearings, it 
was learned that regulatory officials in the lower echelons of all 
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three departments had kept these issues to themselves, and did not 
force the disagreements to the level of the Secretary's office. USDA 
officials bear the major burden of the failure of the interdepart-
mental agreement since the final decision-making responsibility 
was theirs, but HEW and the Department of Interior are not free 
from criticism. Either HEW and Interior did not have sufficient 
interest in the disagreements to force them, or they felt the price of 
involving political appointees in such decisions was too great. 
Whatever the motivation, none of the departments used the 
administrative means that were available to them to settle their 
disagreements prior to 1969. 
Even in the best of circumstances, interdepartmental arrange-
ments for making routine decisions are difficult to execute. Secre-
tary Hardin, Secretary Finch, and Secretary Hickel were fully 
and sincerely committed to work together on pesticide problems. 
The interdepartmental agreement was revised by them to improve 
the channels for bringing disagreements to the Secretaries' offices 
for settlement. The Subcabinet officers in all three departments 
were committed to making the arrangement work. 
Yet, I constantly found myself reaching deep into the organiza-
tion in order to make sure that the disagreements would surface. 
In addition, where there might be a willingness on the part of some 
HEW personnel to agree verbally with USDA positions on health 
aspects of registrations, there was an unwillingness to so state in 
writing. In one instance the solution was to send a letter across at 
Subcabinet level stating that the letter confirmed USDA's under-
standing of HEW's position. 
USDA was committed to making the agreement work despite 
the difficulties involved in the split responsibilities. Nevertheless, 
the expectation of continued difficulties with interdepartmental 
decision-making was one of the reasons that USDA supported the 
consolidation of pesticide regulation in the new Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
In combination with the foregoing factors there was still another 
which contributed to the decline of public confidence in the regu-
lation of pesticides. It was the change the public demanded in the 
amount and kind of information it expected from regulatory agen-
cies. USDA had had a long tradition of providing its services and 
executing its regulations with a minimum of fanfare. 
This concept worked for many years. Public confidence in new 
technology was high. Success stories pouring out from research and 
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pest control agencies assured the public of better things yet to 
come. In recent years, the attitude of the public changed. The 
utopian promises of technology turned into disillusionment as 
atomic energy threatened worldwide destruction and the multitude 
of products we thought were necessary for living, including pesti-
cides, polluted our lands and streams and air. These events raised 
serious doubts about the assurances so lavishly proclaimed by the 
public administrator regulating that technology. 
The public wanted to be told what was wrong and what needed 
to be done before any corrective action was taken. And with fre-
quently more than one choice of action available, the public 
wanted to know what these choices were and on what basis adminis-
trators would make the selection. The public wanted a stronger 
role in making these selections. 
The day of professional authoritarianism was over and the regu-
latory, research and extension education agencies in Agriculture 
did not know it. They found it impossible to modify their tradi-
tionally quiet way of doing the public's business either fast enough 
or far enough to retain the public's confidence in their actions. 
Even today, many state, university and federal agricultural agencies 
as well as others are having difficulty adjusting to the "noisy" way 
of doing the public's business. 
A longstanding philosophy regarding the responsibility of 
product users for their own safety had considerable influence on 
the way pesticides were regulated. The laws, regulations and the 
enforcement actions were based almost entirely on the premise 
that if instructions for use and warnings of hazard were adequately 
stated on the product labels, the responsibility of the public agency 
to the user was fulfilled. If the user injured himself, his family, his 
plants or animals because he did not follow instructions on the 
label, he had only himself to blame. 
Accepting responsibility for self-injury from use of hazardous 
materials, both man-made and living, has been and still is taken 
for granted by most farmers as risks that go with their way of life. 
Farming has always been a hazardous occupation. Tractors, all kinds 
of other power equipment, horses, cattle, pitchforks, axes, storms, 
floods, diseases and pests kill and injure farmers and their crops 
and livestock every day of the year. People who farm for themselves 
consider the use of poisonous chemicals as only another hazard to 
be reckoned with. From their point of view, the injuries to them 
and accidents to their crops and livestock resulting from the use of 
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pesticides are much less than the injuries from other hazards of 
farming. 
Not so with the homeowners and urban consumers. They expect 
that the products they purchase are useable with a minimum of 
skills, detailed procedures or cautions. They demand that the safety 
and effectiveness of a product be beyond doubt or that its hazards 
be so dramatically displayed that they cannot be ignored or over-
looked. If these needs cannot be met, then they do not believe the 
product should be available for them to buy. 
The farm worker's thinking is somewhere in between that of the 
urban consumer and the independent farmer. In addition, the un-
certainties of their income and the often transient nature of their 
living tend to limit their acceptance of training or precautions in 
the use of hazardous substances. 
Thus, the rapidly growing use of pesticides by homeowners and 
urban consumers, the increasingly widespread use by farmers and 
public agencies, the involvement of large numbers of farm em-
ployees either directly or indirectly in the use of these chemicals 
made labelling laws ineffective as the sole means for regulating 
pesticides. 
The farm-operator-oriented Department of Agriculture was slow 
to recognize this changing need. This bias did not occur because 
of an interest in protecting farmers or agribusiness from regulation 
but because of a philosophical heritage from farmers regarding user 
responsibility. 
No appraisal of past mistakes is really useful unless recommenda-
tions can also be offered for the future. Hindsight is effective only 
when it is used to avoid, or at least reduce, the future probability 
of failures. 
Regulatory agencies can be responsive to changing public needs. 
But major changes will need to be made in many of the organiza-
tional, staffing and operational patterns now in existence. 
The actual staffing of an agency itself can help create the potential 
for introducing new ideas. In the past, more often than not, re-
placement personnel have been recommended because of their 
acquaintance with the existing operations of the organization and 
not because they might bring in new insights and ideas for change. 
And while scientists can and must play an important role in 
regulatory decision-making, their technical expertise should com-
plement the sensitivity to public needs and legal procedures that 
concerned citizens, lawyers, administrators, political scientists and 
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others from a wide range of professions and interests can also 
contribute. 
Within the staff groups that are charged with review and evalu-
ation of specific regulatory responsibilities, there should be at 
least one group that is continually obtaining and evaluating infor-
mation useful in anticipating the need for future changes. This is 
a group that is missing in most regulatory agencies. The agencies 
become so involved in meeting daily crises that they can seldom 
get sufficiently on top of their work to take a look at trends and 
their implications for the future. In those agencies where such 
activity does go on, it is usually accomplished by ad hoc groups or 
consultants who do not have the time or responsibility to do a 
thorough and comprehensive evaluation. 
The use of external groups such as advisory committees must be 
more than just an accommodation to the organized critics of the 
agency. Advisory groups need to represent all segments of society 
that may be affected by the agency's actions. In agriculture, they 
would include consumers, conservationists, public health person-
nel, urban industry representatives, manufacturers and farmers-
the small as well as the large. People representing some of these 
interests are not organized and are difficult to select. Nevertheless, 
they must be brought into the system so they can contribute to the 
attitudes and positions of the agency. 
Those invited to participate on advisory groups must have as-
surance that the establishment of the group is more than window-
dressing to legitimize decisions made by the agency. They must not 
be made a captive of the agency and thereby inhibited from dis-
owning the agency's decisions. The wariness of being used--of 
being co-opted-prevents some people from accepting representa-
tion on advisory groups. Often, they are the very people most 
needed with the most to contribute to needed change. 
In some cases, different advisory groups for each point of view 
may be necessary to obtain constructive advice. In any event, the 
advisory structure developed must provide for the most active 
injection of ideas from people who represent those affected by the 
agency's actions, and not just those groups being regulated. Some 
form of staggered rotation of advisory group membership is also 
essential to provide for change of ideas along with continuity of 
understanding. 
Such "opening-up" of the regulatory agency would make it more 
responsive to changing public needs. Another highly important 
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opening-up procedure is that which deals directly with public 
information. The agency must take the public into its confidence 
and tell it like it is. The administrator of a regulatory agency must 
learn to be comfortable and to find his challenges and satisfactions 
in the debate and sometimes acrimonious controversy that will fol-
low when the public knows what the problems are and what the 
choices for solutions are. Administrators and information person-
nel must be dedicated to objectivity, to being open and frank with 
the public and unafraid to admit fallibility. 
The placement of regulatory responsibilities in the Federal 
Government ought also to be organized so that such responsibilities 
are as undivided as possible. Responsibilities that are diffused 
through a number of agencies and administrators not only frustrate 
the public and regulated parties who must deal with the regula-
tions but also provide a fertile soil for bureaucratic disagreement, 
misunderstanding, infighting and ineffectiveness. 
For pesticides the consolidation of responsibilities has essentially 
been accomplished by the establishment of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. For other regulatory responsibilities, the prin-
ciple of establishing agencies and departments along the lines of 
National goals provides the basis for consolidating operations hav-
ing common objectives. 
As long as there are chickens to be guarded, there will be foxes 
to worry about. But because they are an easily recognized threat 
they are also among the easiest to deal with. More difficult are those 
dangers not so highly visible: The design of the chicken house may 
be hopelessly out of date; new threats to the chickens' safety may 
have developed; geese and turkeys may have been added to the 
flock with no corresponding adjustment in management practices; 
the reasons for wanting to protect the chickens in the first place may 
have changed. 
Along with keeping a sharp eye out for fox-like characteristics 
among ourselves, we who are charged with the administration of 
regulatory functions must be ever-mindful of the needs and wishes 
of those who actually own the chickens. We must provide for a 
constant infusion of ideas and insights and evaluation of changing 
public needs if we are to be truly responsible-and responsive-
servants of the people. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* Director, Science and Education, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
1 Act of April 26, 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 335 (repealed, Act of June 25, 
1947, ch. 125, §16, 61 Stat. 172). 
261 Stat. 163, 7 U.S.C. §135-135(k). 
373 Stat. 286, 7 U.S.C. §135-135(k). 
468 Stat. 511, 21 U.S.C. §342. 
5 I was an active researcher in those days and reacted just as indig-
nantly as all the rest of my colleagues to the exaggerations and emo-
tional appeal of Silent Spring. 
678 Stat. 190, 7 U.S.C. §135-135(k). 
